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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FOR PUBLIC POLICY: WITH
EXAMPLES FROM FAMILY LAW AND ADVICE ON
SECURING FUNDING ∗
Richard Lempert

Perhaps more than in any other field, legal scholarship has aimed
directly at influencing public policy. Hence, it is not surprising that
empirical scholarship on law related issues often seems to have an agenda
that extends beyond the common social science goals of adding to our
knowledge base and understanding of human behavior to suggesting to
policy makers and practitioners legal and administrative changes that will
ameliorate problems they confront and, by the researcher’s lights, make this
a better world in which to live.
There are, however, many dangers in relying on empirical work,
rather than normative arguments, to influence policy. 1 Empirical work is
social science, and the standards of social science as well as what it
determines can change. Methods, data availability and, to some extent, data
quality are improving all the time. What was state of the art research
yesterday may be perceived as hopelessly flawed tomorrow, and reanalyzing
even the same data using more modern methods may reveal that the earlier
advice was not just unsupported by the data but contrary to the policies that
the data, properly analyzed, suggest. Institutionalized procedures are slow to
change, however, even when their rationales have disappeared, and the law
can be even slower, particularly if interest groups have benefit from the
status quo regardless of whether it is in the public interest. Thus no matter
how much an empirical scientist likes the results of his or her own research,
a certain humility about advocating policy changes based on it is in order.
Yet policy makers must act. Agencies should strive to be more
effective, and legislators want to enact those laws most likely to advance
well being. These bodies always act with some conception of the status quo
and the dynamics of human behavior in mind. Even if today’s social science
findings may be withdrawn tomorrow, if the science is done well they are
∗
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the best current estimate of the state of the relevant world and of how people
and organizations are likely to respond to certain actions. In particular social
science research can discipline the wishful thinking that can lead people to
ignore problems they don’t want to confront or believe that the policies that
most help them will be best for everyone or that policies they disapprove of
do no good. It can also reveal complexities that mean no single solution
will work everywhere or that solving one problem will raise problems in
other areas. Thus research on police highway stops can reveal whether
unproductive racial profiling is occurring. Research on bilingual versus
English only education can tell us which approach is more conducive to
English learning and or other subject learning among non-native English
speakers as well as whether effects vary by student characteristics. Research
on bankruptcies can tell us something about the role credit card debt, job
loss and health problems in pushing people over the edge.
Sound research on matters like these can help policy makers and
administrators devise more effective laws and procedures. But empirical
studies are almost never a magic bullet. In a society where fifty years of
research was necessary to convince almost everyone who matters that
smoking is a cause of lung cancer and heart disease and where some are still
not convinced of the soundness of climate change science or the likelihood
of evolution, one cannot expect that a few empirical studies will resolve
issues that have divided the public. Nor should they, for in many areas
empirical studies will produce conflicting results with conflicting
implications for policy. Work on capital punishment is a prominent current
example.
There is also the issue of mechanism and its close relative, theory.
Sometimes it is sufficient to know that something works, and we need not
worry (too much) why. Aspirin cured headaches long before people knew
why it helped, and those with aching heads would have been silly had they
refused aspirin until they knew the mechanism that led to their relief. But in
the case of policy relevant empirical research, knowing mechanism is
generally quite important. This is in part because people and places differ.
What works with one group or in one place may not work with another
group or in another place. Also knowing mechanism allows for better
targeted and more efficient interventions. Thus if a preschool program
increased reading readiness because of the phonics approach it employed, it
would suggest different kinds of preschool interventions than if the key were
that each child received one on one attention from a student volunteer.
Theory which posits the mechanism(s) by which effects occur has the added
virtue of allowing strong tests of what we think data reveal. Thus if we
2

theorize that phonics is the mechanism by which a pre-school reading
program works to improve performance, we can experimentally try phonics
and alternative approaches to reading while hold one on one time with
volunteers constant. If the phonics group does better we have greater reason
to believe that it is the (or a) key to the program’s success. Since the world
is complex and outcome soften have multiple causes, considerable research
may be necessary to develop a theory complete enough to provide a reliable
guide to policy.
A story is told of an old country rabbi who was asked by a disciple
what he thought was the best cut of meat. The rabbi told the student it was
tongue. The disciple then asked the rabbi what in his opinion was the worst
cut of meat. The rabbi again said, “tongue.” “How can tongue be the worst
cut of meat when it is the best cut of meat?” said the student confused as
well as a little indignant thinking he was being trifled with. “There is,” said
the rabbi, ‘nothing so good as a good tongue and nothing so bad as a bad
one.” So it is with empirical work and public policy. Nothing is so helpful
as good empirical research and nothing can be so bad as poor research that
becomes influential. But what makes empirical work good or bad? It is to
this issue, I shall now turn – drawing my examples from three studies
designed to inform policy in the area of family law.
These studies are, first, the work of David Chambers on the
enforcement of child support obligations, as presented in his book Making
Fathers Pay, 2 second the study of mandatory arrest for misdemeanor spouse
abuse as described by Larry Sherman and Richard Berk in an article in the
American Sociological Review, 3 and third the study of the implication of
California’s no fault divorce law on the well being of male and female
divorced spouses as presented by Lenore Weitzman in The Divorce
Revolution 4 .
Chambers: Making Fathers Pay
Let me begin with Professor Chamber’s work which, since David
Chambers is a long time colleague and friend, I know best. It, moreover,
should be a heartening tale for law professors who aspire to do empirical
work but wonder whether they have the background for it. When Chambers
2
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began this work, he was a lawyer pure and simple with no special training in
empirical investigation. The study’s earliest roots were not in Chambers’
family law teaching but in his role as an advisor to a law-student group that
offered advice on civil matters to inmates at the Detroit House of
Corrections. In his role as advisor, Chambers accompanied his students on a
tour of the jail. There he saw a number of jail trustees lounging around who
did not resemble the typical prisoner stereotype. When he asked what these
men were in for he was told by the jailer that these were his “runaway
pappies.” It turned out that these men were in jail for non-payment of child
support.
This was surprising, to say the least, for at the time Chambers asked
his question, in the 1970s, the child support system was notorious for its
laxity and its failure to collect the money due divorced wives who had
become custodial parents. Overall child support collections were estimated
to be in the low teens as a percent of what was owed, and the system’s
reluctance to pursue and punish men who ignored child support enforcement
orders was becoming a cause celebre of the then developing women’s
movement. Yet here was a state, or at least a county in a state, that was
actually jailing men for failing to meet their support obligations. Chambers
decided to take a close empirical look at what was happening.
Recalling early conversations, I think it fair to say that when
Chambers began his empirical effort he did not think that jailing men to
collect child support did much good, nor did he want it to because he did not
like to see mainly poor men who were guilty of only a civil offense serving
time in jail. But his early efforts to gather data immediately called this
perspective into question. The data available indicated that as compared to
other states Michigan was remarkably effective in collecting child support;
indeed a highly disproportionate share of the nation’s total child support
receipts were collected in Michigan, and men would flee Michigan to avoid
the state’s child support enforcement practices.
This early field work revealed not only that Michigan did well in
collecting child support, but also that a particular institution, the Friend of
the Court, played an important role in what was happening, for in Michigan,
unlike most states, payments did not go from divorced father (or noncustodial parent) to divorced mother (or custodial parent). Rather payments
went from the divorced father to the Friend of the Court’s office and then to
the divorced mother. Thus a state office had immediate knowledge of which
4

men were behind on their support payments. Friend of the Court offices for
some Michigan counties proactively pursed men who fell behind, while
others, although they knew who was behind, waited until a mother
complained before taking action. Also when they did take action some
Friend of the Court offices were aggressive in seeking jail time for
delinquent fathers while others worked more with fathers, and, if they used
jail at all, used it sparingly.
To shorten what could be a very long story¸ let me cut to the chase.
What Chambers found was that the two variables that distinguished the
different county Friend of the Court offices, proactivity and the use of jail,
played a crucial role in the ability of counties to collect child support debts.
Controlling for other relevant variables, like the father’s job situation,
counties that pursued delinquent fathers without waiting for an ex-spouse to
complain and that moved quickly to jail fathers who persisted in their
delinquency were substantially more successful in collecting amounts due
than those counties that were proactive but reluctant to jail, reactive though
quick to jail once a mother complained, or neither proactive nor willing to
quickly jail. Chambers examined the data form both a cross-sectional and
time series perspective and he also interviewed some fathers and other key
actors, both giving him a richer understanding of problems and processes
and allowing him to write a more interesting book.
Chambers also found that many of the jailed fathers had lost jobs,
suffered illnesses or for other reasons seemed unable to pay. But even these
fathers sometimes paid their child-support debts, apparently because new
partners, parents or others were willing to advance money for their release.
Chambers concluded his study with a series of policy recommendations
designed to reduce, through automatic payroll deductions like those for
FICA and income taxes, both child support delinquency and the jailing of
fathers. The study provided influential in the then developing debate about
how to increase child support collections. Not only did Chambers present
his findings to the Congress, but in true testimony to the contributions a
lawyer can make through empirical research, he also appeared on the Today
Show and was featured in People Magazine.
Chambers’ work is to my mind an exemplar of empirical work by a
law professor. He saw an intriguing issue; rather than speculate or argue on
principle for his preferences he sought to learn what was actually happening
in an area where values conflicted; he designed what was initially a rather
simple study; he saw that the complexities of the empirical situation required
him to dig more deeply than he originally contemplated; he applied for and
5

received a substantial grant in a highly competitive process; he brought into
the study a more experienced empirical researcher (Terry Adams) to aid with
data collection, organization and analysis; he produced a first rate empirical
study including results that ran counter to his original hypotheses and value
preferences, and explained clearly and argued responsibly for the policy
implications that might be drawn from his work.
We also see in this study the importance of understanding mechanism.
For example, a study that contrasted Michigan’s delinquent father jail rates
and child support collection rates with similar rates in the other fifty states
would almost certainly have found large differences on both dimensions and,
accepting a deterrence theory perspective might easily and convincingly
attributed Michigan’s child support collection rate to its jailing policies. Yet
high jailing without proactivity did little good, and imposed on both men
and the state the cost of placing men in jail.
Note also in this example, the importance of the unit of analysis and
the potential of getting misleading results when the wrong unit is used. It is
only by looking at county level data that one can find differences in
proactivity. Since a unit is either proactive or not and counties differed
across Michigan with statewide data only this variable would go undefined.
Thus the only relevant statewide calculation that would be possible would be
the overall state jailing rate since unlike proactivity, county jailing rates
could be aggregated to the state level.
Finally, consider the solution Chambers recommended. It is not a
solution drawn directly from the data though one might think of it as
inspired by it. In advocating not proactivity coupled with jailing but rather
automatic payroll deductions, Chambers identified a way of collecting child
support that had the virtues of proactivty without the cost of jailing and,
which moreover, did not force the obligations of fathers who had no way of
meeting them on their family members.
Sherman and Berk: Effects of Arrest on Misdemeanor Spouse Abuse
The study by Larry Sherman and Dick Berk of misdemeanor spouse
abuse was, at the time it was done, an exemplary evaluation of law
enforcement strategies. It is hard to imagine this study being done by an
inexperienced empirical researcher. It required substantial funding, the
ability to persuade a police department to cooperate with research in a then
almost unheard of way, and sophisticated statistical analyses of the data
collected. What Sherman did (Berk, I believe, was brought in later) was to
persuade the Minneapolis Police Department to institute a field experiment
when called to the scene of alleged spouse (and domestic partner) abuse.
6

Rather than act on their discretion, as police throughout the nation did, the
police were instructed, if the alleged abuse would not support a felony arrest,
to open a sealed envelope and, following the instructions inside, to either (1)
arrest the man accused of abuse, (2) remove the man from the home but not
arrest him or (3) counsel the couple and when things had calmed down to
leave. The experiment was implemented more or less as designed (the need
for sophisticated statistical analysis resulted from the “less’ part) and yielded
seemingly striking results.
The incident that had led to the police being summoned ended with
their arrival, no matter what the police did, but whether measured by later
arrests or a woman’s response when interviewed by phone six months later,
men who had been arrested appeared less likely to engage in repeat abuse
than men subject to either of the other two treatments. In part because
Sherman made an extraordinary effort to publicize the study’s results (e.g.,
he arranged to have a T.V. crew ride with the police on one call so that there
would be video footage to accompany the announcement of the study’s
results when the time came) 5 and in part because the lesson that arrests
works appealed to both conservative law and order types and liberal a
supporters of the women’s movement, the results of this study reverberated
around the country. Numbers of police departments moved to mandatory
arrest or other harsher policies for dealing with spouse abuse.
There were, however, problems with the study evident, even in the
initial ASR article that should have cautioned those who advocated arrest as
the presumptive response to misdemeanor spouse abuse. 6 First, the study
had been done in Minneapolis, hardly a typical American city. In particular
Minneapolis has, apart from Native Americans, a very small minority
population for a city its size. Also Minneapolis soon released the men it
arrested, while other jurisdictions might treat arrestees differently. Thus no
matter how well done the study, there was reason to fear its results would
not generalize to other settings. As importantly, the study said little about
the mechanism through which its results occurred. Rather it assumed that its
findings reflected a deterrent effect. However, looking at the data, it
appeared that the results were largely driven by men who did not return to
5
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their domestic partner relationships after being arrested. Perhaps this is a
good thing, but perhaps not, and perhaps the choice of whether to take steps
that will break up a relationship should be the woman’s choice rather than
one made through police policy.
The National Institute of Justice which had sponsored the Minneapolis
study was a bit taken aback by the speed with which its findings were
disseminated and influenced policy. Although proud of this research and
pleased with its outcome, NIJ made the wise decision to fund five
replications to see if the study’s results were robust to variations in treatment
and would generalize to other places. Perhaps the best of the replications
was done by Sherman and his colleagues in Milwaukee. 7 Here the results
were different from what they had been in Minneapolis. While women of
higher socio-economic status, who presumably had partners of higher socioeconomic status, did seem to gain protection when their abusers were
arrested, women of lower socio-economic status experienced more violence
when their abusers had received the arrest treatment. A mechanism suggests
itself. Men who had a lot to lose through arrest were deterred from future
violence for fear of the sanction. Men who had little to lose or had
experience with being arrested were simply angered, and they took their
anger out on their partners after release from jail. To put this another way,
white, well educated women with employed partners seemed to gain
protection from a mandatory arrest policy but this was at the expense of less
well educated and black women and women with low status jobs if they
worked at all and poorly employed or unemployed partners. Several of the
other replications yielded results consistent with Sherman’s Milwaukee
findings. The policy implications of this body of research are thus quite
ambiguous. 8 Yet the results of the NIJ replications never achieved the
popular dissemination of the original Minneapolis study. 9
Empirical work on this topic has continued. Consider a recent paper
by Radya Iyengar.10 Iyengar uses a different strategy. She uses a quasi7
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experimental rather than an experimental approach and looks at domestic
partner violence in states with mandatory arrest laws for spouse abuse and
states with recommended but not mandatory arrest laws before and after
these laws were passed. She finds an apparent increase in intimate partner
homicides in mandatory arrest states after they enact mandatory arrest laws
but no such increase in recommended arrest states. Her explanation for this
is that mandatory arrest laws deter calls to the police who might stop an
altercation before it becomes fatal. To test this theory she looks at family
homicides that do not involve intimate partners since mandatory arrest laws
for family abuse cover such abuse as well but the abused person, often, she
speculates, a child will have their cases reported by outside authorities like
doctors or teachers. Since homicides in these cases do not increase after the
passage of mandatory arrest laws she sees her thesis that spouses are
deterred from calling the police by mandatory arrest laws as supported.
This body of research carries numbers of lessons for those interested
in using empirical studies to inform social policies. Perhaps the most
important is the way political forces can build upon and implement results
they find congenial even when much more work is needed to understand a
problem. The original Sherman and Berk article carries cautions about
generalizing from its findings to policy, but boiler plate cautions in technical
articles are unlikely to carry much weight with policy makers, and in this
case Sherman’s efforts to publicize the research results in the popular press 11
more than counteracted any dampening of enthusiasm that might stem from
a reference to the need for more research and abstention from hasty action.
Second, even well-designed research has its limits. Well done field
experiments are about as good as one gets in policy-related research. But
good may be far from perfect, depending on how the research results are
applied. One limitation of the Sherman and Berk study is its apparent
context dependence. Seemingly similar treatments can have quite different
effects in different locations or at different points in time if their
implications can depend on population, organization and other local
characteristics. 12
Another limitation of the research from a policy perspective is that
despite appearances Sherman and Berk were not testing the deterrent effect
of mandatory arrest policies, although the research was interpreted as if they
11
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were. Rather they were testing the experience of three different treatments:
arrest, forced separation and cautioning, on men whose abuse they had
broken up. No man who was arrested and no spouse of an arrestee had
reason to expect an arrest was certain the next time the police were called
because of alleged abuse. But when a mandatory arrest law is place, men
and women are likely to know it. It is in part this insight that drive’s
Iyengar’s research.
A third point is that wise policy depends on understanding
mechanism. In the original Sherman and Berk research it was suggested
that the mechanism by which mandatory arrest worked to reduce repeat
violence was the deterrence of abuse attributable to the experience of arrest.
But there were ambiguities from the start. To begin with there were two
measures by which future abuse was measured: records of later calls to the
police and reports that the women gave when later interviews. Results
across treatments differed by measure. This should have raised if not a red,
a yellow caution flag. Perhaps more importantly data that received little
attention indicated that arrested men were substantially less likely to return
to their intimate partnerships than those who experienced the other
treatments. Men may thus have been deterred from maintaining
relationships rather than from further abuse. Is the decision to break up
relationships where there is some abuse one that the state should make for
women, or should women make this decision for themselves, at least when
the abuse does not rise to the level of a felony?
Iyengar’s study is also ambiguous with respect to mechanism. It
could be that, as she suggests, women in mandatory arrest jurisdictions are
more reluctant to call the police and so do not use a police summons to
extricate themselves from situations likely to become fatally violent. 13 It
may also be the case that men knowing they will be arrested if the police are
called are more violent, to the point occasionally of homicide, in attempts to
prevent their partners from calling the police. Or the mechanism may be
13
Iyengar ignores the fact that the police are often called to the scene of domestic violence by a neighbor
disturbed by what is going on or by a child rather than by a spouse. The implications of such calls for her
theory and its test are unclear. They could dampen the apparent effects of mandatory arrest laws if her
theory is correct, making her results yet more impressive or they could suggest there is a need to look
elsewhere for causality and, in particular, that her control for other family (expect to be child) abuse arrests
is not as strong as it might appear because the difference in the proportion of calls initiated by the abused
person is less than it might seem. What we need is some information about the proportion of spouse abuse
calls that come from third persons. The child abuse control is also weak, I might add, because mandatory
arrest laws assume the abuser is known. When police arrive while the abuse is ongoing, it is clear abuse
has occurred and the identity of the abuser is relatively easy to establish, even if both parties are treated as
abusers. With child abuse the abuse is not ongoing and the abuser’s identity may not be clear. Moreover,
the abuser may be the mother rather than the father, and men may respond differently to arrests for abuse
than women.
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entirely different. Perhaps women in recommended arrest states or in states
with no laws feel more empowered vis-à-vis their men because whether a
man gets arrested may depend largely on their preferences. Alternatively the
mechanism may have nothing directly to do with the laws impact during an
argument. Unless first offense calls to the police are substantially deterred
in mandatory arrest states, presumably more men in these states will have
been arrested for spouse abuse than men in other states. These arrests may
have caused them to be embarrassed in front of colleagues, to have to spend
money on bail and lawyers fees or even to lose their jobs. Perhaps it is the
strains that these kinds of experiences place on a marriage or the drinking
they can lead to that increases homicide rates even if the initial experience of
arrest has a deterrent effect.
One difference between Minneapolis and Milwaukee was that in
Minneapolis men were soon released after arrest and often suffered few
further consequences, but in Milwaukee they were likely to be in jail longer
and the collateral effects of the arrest may have been worse. Since states
likely to enact mandatory arrest laws may be likely to treat men accused of
abuse more harshly in other respects, it could be treatment other than arrest
that is at the root of apparent homicide wise. If Iyengar had information on
state bail and charging policies she might be able to do more to pinpoint the
reasons for the results she reports. In this respect Iyengar’s study illustrates
a further need for caution. Regression models like those she uses can only
control for variables they can measure. If influential variables are not
included in the model an explanation may be entirely different from what
might appear. A major advantage of the randomized field experiment is that
it can control for variables that are not be measured.
Both Sherman and Berk and Iyengar have in their own ways
conducted studies that have considerable strengths as social science. The
Sherman and Berk study was more than that, for although it was not the first
field experiment done to study policing 14 it was path breaking in
implementing an experimental design at the individual arrest level.
Nevertheless, it is fair to ask what light this research has shed on the
question of whether mandatory arrest policies for misdemeanor spouse abuse
protect women’s interests. I conclude not much. Iyengar may be right in
her judgment that on balance mandatory arrest increases rather than
decreases intimate partner violence, or as the Milwaukee study suggested
mandatory arrest policies may protect some women and harm others,
depending on their characteristics and those of their partners. But one can
14

The first was probably the Kansas City intensive patrol experiment. [Cites]
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hardly have a law that calls for the mandatory arrest of people with some
demographic characteristics while only warning or separating those in other
groups.
This does not mean that empirical research could not productively
inform police responses to domestic violence. Indeed, early research might
have done that by first revealing how feeble police responses often were and
later calling into question certain counseling approaches. But to yield the
kind of transformative policy implications that many drew from the
Minneapolis experiment, more than an occasional experiment here or quasiexperiment there is needed. Society must invest in long term programmatic
research. Something we appear unwilling to do. Moreover, the research is
unlikely to get us far if it only asks whether one treatment works better than
another. Averages, even if accurately assessed, can hide lots of variance.
Rather the aim must be to generate theory and understand mechanisms.
Only with such understanding is even good social science likely to get us
anywhere in the policy arena.
Weitzman: The Divorce Revolution
Lenore Weitzman’s research purported to show that following the
passage of California’s no fault divorce law divorcing women’s income fell
relative to their needs by 73% while men’s income relative to needs
improved by 42% . Weitzman’s numbers are striking, and it is hard not to
attribute them to changes wrought by the California no fault law since other
research in states without no fault showed smaller drops in women’s relative
well being post divorce (about 33%) and smaller gains for post divorce men
(about 15%-20%). Weitzman’s figures were consequently picked up by the
news media, cited in legislative hearings and figured importantly in debates
about adopting and structuring no fault divorce laws.
If the work was influential, it is hard to fault the public for being
influenced since Weitzman’s book received the American Sociology
Association’s annual book prize award. Still there were reasons to be
skeptical of this work from the outset. First, the most publicized results
were based on a relatively small sample (228 respondents divided equally
between men and women) of people living only in Los Angeles, with an
oversample of wealthier individuals. Also Weitzman was not known as a
quantitative researcher, and she could not or would not furnish the data from
her study to those who sought to acquire it. More importantly the results
were inconsistent with numbers of other studies of the effects of divorce on
the economic well-being of men and women, and a 73% drop in well-being
12

is so large as to almost defy credulity, since 100% would be the maximum
fall possible. Eventually, Richard Peterson gained access to the raw records
from which Weitzman had worked. 15 He corrected numerous coding errors
and reanalyzed the data. He found that women’s income to needs ratio fell
to 27% following divorce, while men’s rose by about 10%, results consistent
with or even showing somewhat less gender bias than other similar research.
Other work fills out the picture. Pamela Smock, for example, finds
immediate post divorce disparities in gender well-being are entirely
attributable to women with children, reflecting the fact that women are most
often custodial parents and the standard need measure accounts for the
number of people in a household. 16 Still others, using different measures,
have disputed whether men’s economic well being indeed increases after
divorce. 17
Peterson’s figures and most of the best subsequent work do not
change the bottom line: there is a serious problem – especially in regard to
the post-divorce economic well being of women with children - that needs to
be addressed. But the other research does change our understanding of why
the problem exists. Moreover, putting studies together it appears that
whether one lives in a fault or no fault state has no implications for how well
off marital partners will, on average, be post divorce. Professors, students,
legislators and others who examined no fault laws through the prism of
Weitzman’s research appear to have been seriously mislead.
One caution to draw from the Weitzman study is the realization that
good empirical research is hard to do, which means one must ask who is
doing the research. It is not enough to plug data into a canned statistical
package and generate results. To decide on tests and interpret results the
logic of hypothesis testing must be understood and there must be good
appreciation for what measures mean and data quality issues. A second
lesson is that when a quantitative study bears importantly on a policy issue,
it is important that the data used be widely available and that different
researchers examine the issue. A third concerns the danger of agendadriven research. Research should be aimed at testing theories not at making
points. While I don’t know if Weitzman set out to show that no fault
15
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divorce laws harm women, some have thought this was her aim and even if
it wasn’t her ready willingness to embrace the result might have blinded her
to problems with her data and what it suggested. There is a difference
between wielding data like a lawyer, which means providing only that
information and those interpretations that advance a client’s interest and
using it like a social scientist which means using it to advance knowledge by
putting favored theories to the hardest possible test and revealing and even
calling attention to results that contradict what one would like to claim.
Only when empirical research has the latter characteristics should it enter
policy debates. But too often it is agenda driven research that seems to
speak loudest to policy makers.
In addition to my specific comments on the studies I have reviewed
in detail, there are a number of lessons the policy maker or law professor
reading empirical work might learn from this brief review. Here are five:
(1) Don’t rest policy change or analysis on a single study no matter how
good it is; (2) Look beyond the researcher’s bottom line to other
relationships revealed in the data; (3) If results seem too good to be true this
may be because they are not true, and (4) Always ask about mechanism;
understanding why a situation exists is as important to policy analysis as
knowing whether it exists, and (5) no matter how unversed one is in
statistics, common sense and close reading can take one a long way.

Smock and Manning: Living Together Unmarried
In addition to using empirical research to inform policy, lawyers can
look to empirical work to anticipate legal issues that are here but as yet
unacknowledged by the law or are likely to arise in the near future. To
continue with family law examples, consider a synthetic article by Pamela
Smock and Wendy Manning on cohabitation and its implication for family
policy. 18 Smock and Manning are family demographers who have
published on a range of subjects. Their article documents the rising age of
marriage in the United States over the past 50 years (from a median age of
about 20 for women in 1950 and 23 for men to a median of 25 for women
and almost 27 for men in 2000) and an equally striking rise in the number of
cohabiting households (from less than 500,000 in 1960 to more than 4.5
18

Pamela Smock and Wendy Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic
Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 Law & Policy 87 (2004)

14

million in 2000, with 48% of women in their late 30s in 1995 reporting at
least spell of cohabitation.) Moreover, they report, about 1/3 of births in the
United States are now occurring outside of marriage with about 1 in 8
children now being born to cohabiting couples, many of them planned.
Overall about 40% of cohabiting unions now have children present, just a
slight bit under the 45% of married couples who report the presence of
children. This situation and these trends portend numerous challenges for
the law. Family law scholars are aware of many of these challenges and the
law has begun to grapple with some of them, but reliable information on the
degree and velocity of these changes has important implications for the
kinds of responses that are needed and the urgency with which we work
toward them.
Doing Empirical Research
Empirical research relating to most issues outside of law and
economics has been dominated to date by social scientists rather than
lawyers and the situation is not likely to change. However, as David
Chambers’ research makes clear lawyers, even those initially untrained in
empirical research, can do valuable, high quality empirical work. Moreover,
they can see issues ripe for investigation which sociologists, economists and
others will not have on their radar screens for investigation. Moreover with
the increased interest in empirical studies in the law school world, we are
likely to see more legal scholars, particularly younger legal scholars,
attempting empirical projects. It is for them I write what follows.
Empirical research on legal issues can take various forms. We are
today blessed with numbers of high quality data sets, like those produced by
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, Ad Health, the New Immigrant
Survey, the Population Study of Income Dynamics and, of course, the
various census surveys. Moreover they are conveniently available on line
for exploration and investigation, always accompanied by necessary
documentation and sometimes with tools to aid analysis. Complementing
these data sets are relatively user friendly statistical packages that allow
novices to implement statistical approaches to data that were cutting edge
only a few years ago. It will, however, be the rare legal scholar who enjoys
a comparative advantage in analyzing these data. Simple relationships like
those reported by Smock and Manning will be known from the literature,
and more complex investigations are best undertaken by those with
statistical knowledge that few law professors possess.
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But this does not mean that law professors and their students cannot
muck around in these data, looking for relationships that others did not think
to examine and posing simple tests of association and causality. Moreover,
the world of social science scholarship is today far more interdisciplinary
than it was even a decade ago, and there is often a place for lawyers on
interdisciplinary teams examining data on legally relevant relationships or,
indeed, identifying legally relevant questions that social scientists untrained
in the law would miss.
Often, however, the kinds of questions that lawyers seek answers to
are not questions that can be addressed entirely, if they may be addressed at
all, through existing data sources. Law professors interested in a particular
issue will often find that they need to collect their own data if they are to
shed empirical light on the problem. There are many ways to collect
empirical data to inform law and policy. The right way or ways depends on
the problem examined, the questions asked and the hypotheses to be tested.
The data in David Chambers study was based largely on the records of
Friends of the Court offices and interviews with key informants. Weitzman
used survey research and Sherman and Berk instituted a field experiment.
Austin Sarat and William Felstiner sat in divorce lawyers offices to observe
and record interactions between divorce lawyers and their clients. 19 Legal
rulings can be examined empirically through content analysis and the
assembly of information on judges, lawyers and parties. Litigation trends
may be studied using data collected by state and federal authorities or by
jury verdict reporting services. Historical studies may draw on news
archives, old diaries and moldy records retrieved from court basements.
Laboratory studies can examine the psychodynamics of legal processes.
And I am sure I have left some approaches and data sources out.
I have observed during my career that law professors and their
students are often intrepid empirical researchers, exploring problems on a
shoestring that sophisticated social scientists would not touch without six
figure grants. This can in part be done because law students are often
enthusiastic and low cost data collectors, coders and research assistants. But
before lawyers abandon conventional scholarship and start collecting data,
several caveats must be mentioned.
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First, empirical research takes time, often far longer than one might
have anticipated. In particular projects that involve collecting one’s own
data, as opposed to using existing data sets, are seldom suitable for the
untenured, particularly if human subjects are involved, except when
sufficient articles have already been produced to ensure tenure or possibly as
part of a competent, experienced research team. IRB approval alone can
delay projects by months, if not half a year or more. Moreover, data are
never acquired in pristine condition, suitable for immediate analysis. Instead
substantial time must be devoted to reconciling inconsistencies and
otherwise cleaning the data, with additional time devoted to training coders
and coding the data.
Once data are collected, cleaned, coded and otherwise ready for
analysis, it may be that they will yield a number of valuable articles, but here
the untenured faculty member may run into another problem. Law faculty
who don’t do empirical research and who are used to putting all their ideas
on a topic into one gigantic article, may regard several separate smaller
articles that test different hypotheses with the same data set as essentially
aspects of the same piece, even though it is common for social scientists to
draw many separately published pieces from the same acquired data.
Equally frustrating, traditionally oriented senior faculty may fail to
recognize the time, thought, skill and scholarship that went into the data
collection phase of the project. Thus they may see a junior colleague with
four or five shorter articles exploring aspects of data she collected as less
productive than a cohort at the same career stage with two lengthy pieces,
even though the work needed to collect, organize and analyze the first
faculty member’s data far exceeds that which can be expected to yield two
typical “tenure pieces.”
Second while some empirical work can be done on the cheap, often
doing it right will cost money – more money than a law school’s research
fund or other easily accessible sources can cover. This may not always
appear to be the case at the start, but as my colleague David Chambers
discovered early stages of empirical research may open up more questions
than answers or may reveal that definitive answers to the problem that
motivated the inquiry cannot be provided without a significantly greater and
more expensive effort.
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The good news is that there are sources of money for projects that can
cost two or even three hundred thousand dollars and up. The bad news is
that grants of this size, and even substantially smaller grants, are quite
competitive and often hard to get. At the National Science Foundation
where I spent four years as Director of the Division of Social and Economic
Sciences, funding rates typically ran between 20 and 30% of submitted
proposals, and it was common to see proposals funded on only a second or
third submission. (Another reason why law professors who must produce
articles to meet a tenure time table should be cautious about being the lead
or solo investigator on major empirical work, particularly if they lack
relevant training and grant-writing experience.) Furthermore, at NSF law
professors did not get any special breaks with their submissions, but were
held to the same standards with respect to theoretical and methodological
sophistication as any other person submitting to a social science program.
The same is likely to be true of most funding agencies.
These standards include deep knowledge of relevant theory,
methodological and statistical skills adequate to the proposed research, and
reason to believe that the proposed research will advance knowledge in a
field or discipline. While the potential practical importance of a research
project would never count against it and is in fact something of a plus,
potential practical value alone would not justify NSF funding. Indeed,
panelists reviewing proposals in most if not all the programs I supervised
would regard a principle investigator’s decision to rest a case for funding
largely on the practical value of what might be learned as a sign that the
investigator was insufficiently versed in theory and methods or otherwise
unconcerned with a project’s potential science contributions.
Not all potential funders share NSF’s basic science commitment. The
National Institute of Justice, which funded the Sherman and Berk study, is,
for example, a mission agency. Their mission is supply the science and
other resources needed to reduce crime. In the mandatory arrest study, an
important driver of funding for them was the likelihood that the proposed
field experiment would inform the policing of domestic violence in ways
that would discourage repeat violation, but even so the research was
presented to them as a test of deterrence theory. Still they were less
concerned than NSF would have been with exactly why repeat offending
might or might not drop with mandatory arrest than they were with
answering the question of whether it would drop, and a randomized field
experiment seemed to them the best way of answering the latter question.
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But as we saw, inattention to mechanism was the Achilles heel of any
otherwise excellent study. Not knowing whether mandatory arrest worked
by breaking up cohabitation or through deterrence and not knowing how
people in different socioeconomic situations might react to the experience of
arrest gave the study a potentially perverse policy relevance that was
unfortunately realized in some jurisdictions.

Once a funding source or sources is identified, the task becomes one
of preparing and submitting a proposal. Whatever the funder, there will
almost always be some person at the funding agency who will be happy to
talk about what his or her agency is looking for and how to go about making
a proposal. Make an appointment by e-mail to talk to that person, by
telephone or even in person if you can manage that and if the person is
willing. It never hurts to have the person who will help decide funding feel
that an applicant is not a complete stranger or see reflected in a proposal
ideas or organization that he or she suggested. As importantly, a
conversation can prevent a substantial waste of time, for you may soon learn
that despite the language with which proposals have been invited what you
would propose funding would either not be eligible for funds or would be
unlikely to get funded even if it were not absolutely disqualified.

It is also important to think about the appropriate team for conducting
an empirical research project and to check with the funder on its attitudes
and concerns regarding team research. While much of the research that NSF
funds is single investigator research and while private foundations and other
agencies also make single investigator grants, more and more research
funding is going to disciplinary partnerships or interdisciplinary teams.
Moreover, most law professors seeking funding for empirical work are
unlikely to get very far with most funders if they are not working closely
with social scientists who can supply the methodological, statistical and
other skills that they lack or may appear to lack. In addition experienced
social scientists, particularly those with a track record of funding from the
agency approached, can be a huge help in tailoring a proposal for an agency.
Even if such a person is not part of a team, a law professor principal
investigator should try to identify experienced grant getters at his or her
university and seek feedback on his or her proposal from them.
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Finally we come to the proposal. Exactly what one should write and
how it should be organized will vary from funder to funder. The funder’s
web site and officer in charge can provide relevant advice. Almost always
there will be a discussion section which designed to show familiarity with
the relevant literature. This section is usually toward the front of the
proposal and provides the reviewer with an initial and sometimes
unchangeable impression of the applicant’s ability to think and write clearly.
Don’t assign this to a student assistant and be sure the search for relevant
prior sources is thorough. I have seen more than one proposal’s funding
chances go down the drain when a panelist noted that a central article in the
field (sometimes by the panelist) was nowhere cited. So if there is a highly
regarded article that a reviewer might possibly think relevant to the research,
a wise investigator will cite it if only awareness of the work and to explain
why it is being disregarded.
Some programs and some panelists like a clear statement of
hypotheses in specific, clearly testable form. The need for laying out a
proposal in this way should depend on the goals of the research, but some
people think good science requires this kind of presentation regardless.
Specifying hypothesis does not, however, require having any expectations
about what the data will reveal. One can not only specify the null hypothesis
which posits that a factor will not matter but he/she can also make clear that
there is no basis for deciding in advance whether the null is likely to be
rejected. It is also appropriate, particularly in the context of case studies, to
indicate that the proposed research is more about hypothesis generation than
hypothesis testing, but there is need for care and persuasiveness in making
the case.
When I read proposals what most concerns me are the methods for
data collection and analysis. One mistake I have frequently encountered is
researchers who take so much space reviewing the literature and specifying
and justifying hypotheses that they have little room left to discuss and justify
their data sources, included variables and analytic methods. No matter how
interesting a proposal is to this point, if it is vague or weak on data and
methods, I see a decision to fund as buying a pig in a poke. I, and many
others I have seen reviewing proposals in panels, will not do this. So
researchers must save space in their proposals for an adequately detailed
description of how they will acquire the data needed to test their hypotheses
and how they will analyze it. This section should make clear the
investigators ability to rigorously examine the questions posed in the
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proposal with data of adequate quality. This does not mean that weaknesses
in the available data or accessible methods should be glossed over. I have
seen some proposals turned down for unavoidable weaknesses that a
reviewer might have missed had they not been frankly acknowledged, but I
have seen many more fall because the failure to perceive a weakness was
regarded as a sign that the researcher was not up to the analytic task.
Usually one can count on reviewers perceiving the weak points of a
proposal. Unless the investigator recognizes them as well, he or she will
have no opportunity to persuade the reviewer that they are not as serious as
they might seem, that they may be ameliorated to some degree or that to the
extent they are inescapable reported results will be properly qualified.
Principle investigators should not lose sleep over the fact that they are
inexperienced researchers with no funding history. The admonition to avoid
preoccupation with what one cannot change applies here. A track record
helps secure funding, but at NSF and many other agencies numerous first
time researchers are funded each cycle. Indeed, records are often kept of
first time grantees and there can be pressure to ensure that some such
applicants are funded. But if one is a new grant applicant, particularly one
without a strong history of publications, there is a special burden to prove
one’s knowledge and capacity. New investigators especially should strive
to demonstrate within the body of the proposal that they are well acquainted
with the literature, sensitive to the difficulties of the research and
knowledgeable about appropriate methods. I still remember one proposal I
reviewed when I was a member of the NSF Law and Social Science panel in
the late 1970s. No panelist had heard of the principal investigator, as he was
just starting his career, but the knowledge and sophistication revealed in the
proposal simply bowled us over. Indeed, I think this submission became our
number one priority for funding, ahead of many scholars whom we all knew
and admired. We were right. The resulting publication is regarded by some
now as a classic and the principal investigator has gone on to be a productive
scholar of considerable distinction.
Finally, researchers should not expect to get funded on their initial
proposal submission. It may happen, but increasingly proposals at NSF and
other agencies are funded only after one or more resubmissions. Usually a
“declinee” can learn from a proposal’s reviews whether resubmission is
justified, and the funder’s representative – whom the investigator should
have talked with several times by now – can usually provide an assessment
of the likelihood that a resubmission will be worth additional time and effort.
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If one is resubmitting, he/she should not resubmit, essentially the same
proposal with mainly cosmetic changes in the hope that a more sympathetic
reviewer or panel will now fund what was rejected the first time the first
time around. It is not likely. At NSF and elsewhere reviewers and panelists
will often include some people new to the proposal but others who have seen
it before. When a panelist or reviewer recalls having seen a proposal before
and notes that little has changed, it is an almost certain kiss of death.
Moreover panelists, program officers and other funders are hugely busy.
Think of them. While it may seem to the investigator that it can’t hurt to
submit an only slightly modified version of a rejected proposal since this
requires little work and lightening may strike in the form of weaker
competition for funds or a more sympathetic review, the review process is
hurt when it is burdened by proposals that have only a slight chance of
success or, more likely, no chance at all.
Moreover, to submit an only slightly revised proposal, unless one has
been advised that that is all that is needed is simply silly. The reviews tell
the investigator what aspects of the proposal most troubled a reviewer or
panel, so allow one to address specifically the weaknesses that caused the
proposal to flounder. What a golden opportunity. This does not provide a
guarantee against frustration, for I have seen proposals revised substantially
to meet a reviewer’s objections only to receive a new review objecting to the
revised approach and suggesting that an approach like the original one
should have been used. However, far more common is the reviewer or
panelist who, recognizing that his/her suggestions have been taken to heart,
is sufficiently impressed (and flattered) to recommend funding.
It is, of course, once a proposal is funded that the hard work begins,
and more than once a researcher may regret his or her funded commitments.
They impose a timetable, and while short term extensions of a grant are
usually easy to arrange so long as additional funding is not sought, there is
nonetheless considerable pressure to produce promised products near the
time one originally promised to have them. This is also, however, where
the sense that what one is doing matters, and the fun of the project begins.
Working with empirical data is a bit like solving a mystery. One continually
asks questions of the data. More often than not the data cooperate and
provide answers, but the answers are seldom final ones. Rather they raise
further questions that take one back to the data for new analyses.
Fortunately, far more often than not, one does have a product worth sharing
with, if not the world, at least one’s scholarly community. At this stage
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there is nothing like empirical work to give a sense of accomplishment. The
writer of a typical law review article, even a very good one, is disseminating
ideas with little more than the hope that others will be influenced by his or
her analysis and that at some point policy will be impacted. But this rarely
happens, even with the work of influential scholars. More commonly a good
law review article is celebrated in academic circles for a while and then
replaced in people’s consciousness by a new hot article. Work that presents
the results of sound empirical research, not only communicates ideas, but it
adds to the profession’s stock of knowledge. Even people with interests
very different from those of the investigator or different perspectives on the
problem studied can draw on what good empirical research has found.
Indeed, collected data may itself be shared, and the sharing may lead to
contributions that go far beyond those that the original investigator made.
Unlike ideas which, if they hadn’t originated in one person may well have
originated with others, facts perceived through empirical investigation might
have remained unknown had the original investigator not thought to look.
In the law as in other disciplines, empirical researchers add to the general
stock of relevant knowledge. Although I have posited as a rule of thumb
that no one study ever provides a sound basis for policy transformation, a
series of consistent studies may well do so. The more deeply legal scholars
get involved in empirical research the better the chance that sound,
evidence-based laws and polices will emerge.
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